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Abstract
This article examines the specific role of Hobbes’ Dialogue of
the Common Laws in the development of the liberal tradition in
the common law. Hobbes usually has been regarded as the founder
of a theory of absolute sovereignty and as an advocate of state
centralization.  In some cases he is even considered a forerunner
of such neoconservative political philosophers as Carl Schmitt
and Leo Strauss. However, this reading of Hobbes will contend
that his philosophical and political enterprise has been misunder-
stood. Opposed to the authoritarian reading I wish to emphasize
a strain of pragmatic and free thinking modernity in Hobbes’ writ-
ings. Hobbes supports freedom of expression and enquiry against
all types of sectarian claims made by the most powerful legal and
religious circles and guilds of that time which he saw as intent on
pursuing their own narrow self-interests against the needs of the
common people. In other words, he was an early advocate of
intellectual freedom and was an agent of change within the con-
ceptual history of common law. The historical influence of these
liberal features of Hobbes set in motion a shift towards a kind of
consequentialist and informal utilitarianism in the understanding
of common law. This is the important historical outcome of A
Dialogue. I argue that the contrast between Hobbes’ rational ju-
risprudence in A Dialogue and common law itself is particularly
significant to the rise of English and American Constitutionalism,
modern individualism and utilitarianism.
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INTRODUCTION
The subject of this article is the historical legacy of Hobbes’ Dia-
logue of the Common Laws, which he wrote in the late 1660s as an attack
on the legal ideas of the common lawyers, and in particular on the ideas
of the greatest lawyer of the early seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke.1
In recent years, it has gradually gained wide but not undisputed accep-
tance among political theorists the view that Hobbes provided a rational-
ist defence for absolutism, but his individualistic methodology and the
use he made of social contract theory, prefigured early liberalism.2  The
importance of Hobbes is firmly rooted in his role as an agent of change in
the history of Western philosophy. To make a long story short, a basic
idea of ‘classical’ political philosophy was developed in Greek antiquity
and adopted __ but transformed __ in the Christian intellectual traditions of
late antiquity and the Middle Ages. This is the idea that the philosophical
consideration of political concepts naturally presupposes normative ideas
connected with some notion of an objective human good, end, purpose,
or function.3  This idea of a human good, as it figures in political theory,
was much more radically transformed in European political philosophy of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries starting more or less with Hobbes
as a sort of demon of modernity.4  By the twentieth century, many major
political philosophers appeared to believe that it is possible 'to do politi-
cal philosophy’ without reference to such a normative metaphysical, ethi-
cal, or religious ideal. Political organization is regarded as a matter of
convention or agreement and, in that sense, as something that is the result
of human artifice rather than a straightforward consequence of human
biology (or of human nature, more broadly). Legitimate political author-
ity is the rational endorsement of all citizens (irrespective of whether such
endorsement ever explicitly occurs).5
However, the role of Hobbes’ Restoration writings in this process
deserves a closer attention than they have usually received. Hobbes in
these writings, that is, in his History of the Civil war, known as Behe-
moth, and in his extensively revised Latin translation of Leviathan, as
well as in the Dialogue of the Common Laws and a number of other,
minor pieces, grappled with the problem that the restored monarchy had
allowed itself to be captured by a powerful group of ideologues __ the
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clergymen of the Church of England and their supporters among the com-
mon lawyers, whom he accused of being a threat against both civil order
and intellectual freedom. A Dialogue’s criticism against these ideologues
had a remarkable historical significance, and the role and the case for
religious toleration in Hobbes should be made more forcefully than it has
been, with some exceptions, by most modern scholars because it is cru-
cially important for the rise of important features of liberalism.6
The meaning of a political concept such as liberalism is often con-
tested, meaning that no neutral or settled definition of it can ever be de-
veloped, but I take the important features of liberalism to which I refer to
be that liberal thought is characterized by a commitment to individualism,
a belief in the supreme importance of the human individual, implying strong
support for individual freedom.7  From the liberal point of view, individu-
als are rational creatures who are entitled to the greatest possible free-
dom consistent with the like freedom for fellow citizens.8  The history of
conceptions of the common law reflects the gradual and uneasy rise and
acceptance of these ideas and in this article I am arguing that Hobbes
contributed to this process by setting in motion a shift towards a kind of
consequentialist and informal utilitarianism in the history of the concep-
tions of common law.9  In this way, the ideas set in motion by Hobbes,
i.e., his individualistic methodology and rationalism, the use he made of
social contract theory and in particular the role and the case he sets for
religious toleration also largely stand at the cross-road of the distinction
between classical liberal thought, which believed in natural law, in the
inalienability of private property and in a minimal state and modern or
contemporary liberal thought, which believes that private property is a
social right and that government should be used to improve life through
social engineering.10
HOBBES’ PLEA FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERATION AS AN
AVATAR OF LIBERALISM
In his great pre-Restoration works, notably of course Leviathan
itself, Hobbes consistently argued that both civil order and intellectual
freedom were fundamental political values, and indeed that it was the
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destruction of intellectual freedom which had commonly led to civil dis-
order, through the creation of armies of bigots determined to rule their
fellow men for ideological ends, so that: “men are either punished for
answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth
for fear of punishment”.11  Against this practice, Hobbes asserted that it
was wrong “to extend the power of the Law, which is the Rule of Actions
only, to the very Thoughts, and Conscience of men”.12  Leviathan, read in
its entirety, was a plea for the ruler of England to secure his power over
his citizens by allying with the supporters of religious toleration, and
thereby to free the citizens from the most formidable threats to their per-
sonal and intellectual liberty. To press this point Hobbes boldly stated:
“Faith is a Gift of God, which Man can neither give, nor take away by
promise of rewards, or menaces of torture”.13  The ruler Hobbes probably
had in mind at the time was precisely a restored Charles II, to whom the
book seems initially to have been dedicated;14 when Charles finally suc-
ceeded in restoring the monarchy, however, he immediately allowed the
Church of England to re-establish a grip upon the religious affairs of the
nation, and Hobbes found himself treated as a prime target by the re-
founded Church, which threatened him with exile, imprisonment or even
death for the theological views he had expressed in Leviathan.15  So the
reign of Charles II constituted for Hobbes a theoretical as well as a per-
sonal challenge: a regime which in general he supported turned out still to
be involved in a struggle against enemies within, and indeed at certain
critical moments to have given way to those enemies. What did Hobbes’
theory imply about the correct response to this situation? Clearly, the
works in which he sought to answer this question by arguing in favour of
religious toleration and for the elimination of sectarian strife are going to
be among the most interesting of his writings, as in them he was forced to
deal with the practical implications of his ideas, and to come to a judge-
ment about the whole of modern English history.  The ideas expressed in
this judgement constitute an avatar of liberalism and contributed to the
development of important features of liberal tradition in the common law.
Indeed, Hobbes always sought freedom of thought and religious
toleration as a remedy against the disorder and oppression caused by
sectarian strife. That there is more into this than the contention in Levia-
than in favour of freedom of thought and religious toleration is confirmed
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by the fact that there is always an implicit or explicit historical theory in
Hobbes: mostly, it is a theory of the corruption of the Christian religion
by Aristotelian philosophy, especially in the Middle Ages. This historical
theory is clearly expressed in Leviathan, but it is possible to read the
seeds of it, at least implicit, into the early works, even though Hobbes is
not giving an historical account of this corruption in The Elements of Law
and De Cive because, as pointed out by Quentin Skinner, in these works
Hobbes eschews historical arguments in favour of rational reasoning.16
So in De Cive, even though no explicit historical account of it is given, it
is already implied a theory of the corruption of human life as a whole by
philosophical speculation beginning with Socrates and which led to the
ideological grip on power by the bigots. This theory is implicitly set out in
the preface to De Cive, as well as in the third section;17  it is referred to in
The Elements of Law Natural and Political,18 and of course explicitly
becomes a full historical account of the corruption of Christian religion in
Leviathan where this account is the central theme of Parts Three and
Four,19 and in the Historia Ecclesiastica.20  This historical account is also
one of the central themes of Behemoth, as well as the exclusive subject of
some of Hobbes’ other post-Restoration writings, such as the Historical
Narration Concerning Heresy.21  A Dialogue also contains this history of
corruption, partly in the history of heresy which is such a striking feature
of this work, and partly in the history of the misunderstanding of politics
which gave rise to the common lawyers’ sense of their own power over
the common people and which together with the ideological power of the
bigots undermines civil order and intellectual freedom.22
But in order to understand the importance of the arguments in
favour of religious toleration in A Dialogue it is also useful to bear in
mind that a natural set of questions to ask about Hobbesian politics, and
one which surely occurred to Hobbes himself, is, what would life under a
well-founded Hobbesian commonwealth actually be like, and has there
ever been a genuine example of such a state; and if not, why not? In
Leviathan he says that we have always lived if not in darkness, then yet in
a mist compared with the lucidity of a well-founded Hobbesian common-
wealth, and that the reason for this is precisely the proliferation of sects,
both of Christian and of secular philosophers.  So, in one sense, by the
presence of an historical narrative, Hobbes in A Dialogue was not provid-
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ing his readers with an analysis of any form of government whatsoever:
he was providing them with an account of a specific kind of government,
with a number of special conditions, notably the elimination of sectarian
strife, which was not to be found in a pure form anywhere in modern
Europe. The absence of this specific kind of government required expla-
nation, however, and Hobbes argues that it is due to the corruption of the
Christian religion by Aristotelian philosophy. To press this point is one
function of the historical discussions in his works. But the historical pas-
sages of A Dialogue are also intended to make Hobbes’ political conclu-
sions palatable to common lawyers and to those with property, the princi-
pal users of common law.24
In all his works, Hobbes consistently expresses deep hostility to
orators who use the power of rhetoric to promote faction and schism,
and who lead people to commit themselves to partial or unexamined moral,
religious and even scientific opinions.25  Freeing genuine personal inquiry
from the internal coercion of the persuasive was always one of Hobbes'
fundamental aims.26 But all his works, to a degree, employ the techniques
of the orator themselves to convince their audience __ rhetoric destroys
itself, much as reason was to destroy itself in Hume.27  Nowhere this is
more evident than in A Dialogue.28  So a plausible explanation for the
rhetorical form in which Hobbes couched the arguments of the book is
that it was a means of slipping into the minds of contemporary readers
especially those imbued with the attitudes of the common lawyers, a theory
of absolutist government which ran counter to their fundamental assump-
tions about sovereignty and the law.29  Hobbes was all the more com-
pelled to coach his arguments in this rhetorical form because he was do-
ing two things at the same time which, at least on the face of it, it was
difficult to render compatible: he was trying to make his conclusions pal-
atable to common lawyers on the one hand and challenging the views put
forward by some common lawyers to undermine their authority with the
propertied on the other.
However, his rhetorical task must be understood in view of the
fact that the situation and the attitudes of the common lawyers were not
univocal. The idea that Hobbes’ theory of absolutist government ran con-
trary to their fundamental assumptions should not be overestimated: re-
cent work by people like Glenn Burgess, Alan Cromartie and Johann
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Sommerville has given us a complex sense of what the attitudes of the
common lawyers were;30  while in the particular case of A Dialogue it
should not be forgotten that Aubrey says that both Hale and Vaughan
read it, and Vaughan, as much of a common lawyer as Hale, greatly ap-
proved of it __ while Hale, as we know, did not.31  So two lawyers as close
as Hale and Vaughan, both friends and executors of the great Selden,
could read A Dialogue in very different ways, which should warn us against
attributing too high degree of uniformity to the common lawyers. There
were always many different interpretative schools among the lawyers,
and the idea expressed by John Davies and to an extent by Coke, that
common law was custom in the sense that it was made informally by the
people themselves was only one view.32  Equally powerful by Hobbes’
time was the view espoused by Selden, and by both Hale and Vaughan,
that common law is lost statute __ statutes the records of whose promul-
gation had been lost, as having been made before the modern sets of
Parliamentary rolls.33  Moreover, on either view it was accepted that any
provision of common law could legally be changed by a simple Parlia-
mentary act, though Coke for one believed that this might be very un-
wise: this is and has always been the law of England.34
In a sense, it was the non-historical side of common law to
which Hobbes was chiefly antagonistic: the idea that common law is “rea-
son” and that therefore any case, in the absence of statute, can be decided
by the “reason” of the judges. There are two features of this. The first is
Hobbes’ interesting argument that the best interpreters of the sovereign’s
will are not judges with their professional or “artificial” reason, but the
common people: and that therefore English juries should be seen as judges
of law as well as of fact.35  This was an extremely radical view, and it still
is __ it is the principle of “jury nullification”, much debated in the United
States, and among Hobbes’ contemporaries only the Levellers espoused
it.36 It might be worth remarking in this context that Hobbes’ admirer
John Vaughan, as Justice of the Common Pleas, later pronounced the
definitive ruling on the incorrigibility of a jury’s decision, which still gov-
erns Anglo-American law.37  A Hobbesian view of the jury thus led to
what has usually been seen as the antithesis of “absolutist” politics, and to
a practical way of limiting state power without handing comparable power
to another institution or sect. The second feature is Hobbes’ realization
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that it was the idea that, in the absence of statute, a judicial case can be
decided by the “reason” of the judges which was permitting the reintro-
duction of laws against heresy into England through the back door.38  Par-
liament, having not renewed the laws in 1640, was unable to reintroduce
them after the Restoration because there was always a majority against
any particular proposal.39  But Coke, and his Restoration followers, be-
lieved that common law incorporated the truths of orthodox Christianity
and could therefore be used to condemn heretics in the absence of statu-
tory sanction.40  In this respect, A Dialogue continues the case for tolera-
tion made by Hobbes in Part Four of Leviathan. I will analyze next this
feature of A Dialogue and in particular the fact that Hobbes by challeng-
ing the belief that common law was the embodiment of universal reason
as understood by the common lawyers contributed to the evolution of
this belief and to a shift towards a kind of consequentialist and informal
utilitarianism.
REASON IN HOBBES AND IN THE COMMON LAW
The fact that for Hobbes law is the rational will of the sovereign
ran against the main claim invariably made about common law, i.e., that it
was the embodiment of reason. Hobbes in A Dialogue points out that to
rest law on reason, and to identify this with individual reason is a recipe
for anarchy. Accordingly, the Philosopher states:
I find my own reason at a stand; for it frustates all the
Laws in the World: for upon this ground any Man, of any
Law whatsoever may say it is against Reason, and there-
upon make a pretence for his disobedience.41
Here indeed Hobbes was right. In fact, the appeal to reason was
continually made by radicals in the Civil War on the authority of Coke
(and later by the French revolutionaries, hence Burke’s famous critique
of them), and Hobbes may have paid attention to the Levellers.42  Hobbes’
point is that individual rationality is indeterminate, even though not all
interpretations are equally valid and true. So he admits the existence of
“true” interpretations, but only given the fact that “True and False are
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attributes of Speech, not of Things”.43  That is to say, “speech” makes
some interpretations less indeterminate than others according to how pre-
cise is the meaning of the words which are used, and to the degree to
which these words are used consistently and unambiguously in accor-
dance with their meaning. Yet to say, as common lawyers claim, that ra-
tionality resides in custom is clearly untrue since we debate the rationality
of customs. So the Philosopher tells the Lawyer:
Now as to the Authority you ascribe to Custome, I deny
that any Custome of its own Nature, can amount to the
Authority of a Law: For if the Custom be unreasonable,
you must with all other Lawyers confess that it is no Law,
but ought to be abolished; and if the Custom be reason-
able, it is not the Custom, but the Equity that makes it
Law.44
Furthermore, to claim, as the common lawyers themselves do, to
have a unique insight into the rationality of custom is, he suspects venal
special pleading. Their reason is no different from anyone else’s, their
knowledge could be gained in a couple of months.45  Despite the rational-
ism of his method, Hobbes’ view, expressed in his Questions Concerning
Liberty Necessity and Chance printed in 1656, is that the claim that rea-
son is a criterion of the content of true law “is an error that hath cost
many thousands of men their lives”.46  In A Dialogue his answer to the
problem of rational indeterminacy is the insistence that “It is not Wisdom,
but Authority that makes a Law”.47  In fact, Hobbes believes that only the
authority of the sovereign, and not the “reason” embodied in any law, can
save lives. Indeed, what reason reveals is the need to have an authorita-
tive determination, not what the nature of that determination was. This
idea was already in the Questions Concerning Liberty Necessity and
Chance, where Hobbes stated:
I think rather that the reason of him that hath the sover-
eign authority, and by whose sword we look to be pro-
tected both against war from abroad and injuries at home,
whether it be right or erroneous in itself, ought to stand
for right to us that have submitted ouselves thereunto by
receiving the protection.48
Giuseppe Mario Saccone  113
On Hobbes’ view all reason is the reason of human individuals,
and individual reason is inherently indeterminate whilst law must be de-
terminate. So only the authority of the sovereign, but not “reason” by
itself, can prevent the fighting caused by conflicting views and save many
lives. Reason cannot, therefore, be the basis for law. This point is raised
here to establish the position which the next generation of common law
thinkers attacked, and in doing so developed a peculiar notion of reason
as custom.
However, there is a sense in which what common law does with
custom, and what Hobbes does with his criticism of “the common law
mind”, share a role in the way the perception of the relationship between
the individual and the state started changing from the seventeenth cen-
tury, i.e., in the growing recognition of the subjective individuality of the
citizens as autonomous social agents within the state, which is one fea-
ture “of the rise of individualism and the modern state” and of liberalism
itself, and grew out of the struggles between king and Parliament. A Dia-
logue by challenging the belief that common law was the embodiment of
universal reason as understood by the common lawyers contributed to
the evolution of this belief. Indeed, Hobbes provoked a more self-con-
scious defence of common law from Hale which, however, inexorably
left the common law mind open to the critical scrutiny underpinning the
difference between being traditional and being consciously traditional. In
fact, as pointed out by Burke and Hegel to whom the distinction between
the two is commonly attributed, once it becomes necessary to convince
the people that tradition must be regarded in the traditional way, it be-
comes clear that they no longer view tradition in that way and that men
“live and trade each on his own private stock of reason”.49  In regard to
this, Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit gives an enlightening exem-
plification of this process by describing what happens when we start en-
quiring about the origin of customary laws:
[I]f I enquire after their origin and confine them to the
point whence they arose, then I have transcended them;
for now it is I who am the universal and they are the con-
ditioned and limited. If they are supposed to be validated
by my insight, then I have already denied their unshakeable,
intrinsic being, and regard them as something which, for
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me, is perhaps true, but also is perhaps not true.50
As exemplified in this passage, the “traditionary” conception of
common law requires a certain naive innocence which, once lost, cannot
be regained. Hale, at least to a certain extent, seems to be aware of this in
his critique of A Dialogue. For this reason, he advances a pragmatic de-
fence of common law by constructing, against the attack of Hobbes’ po-
litical absolutism and rationalism, a more sophisticated defence of com-
mon law, i.e. the defensive development of custom as adaptation. In a
famous image in The History of the Common Law of England, Hale com-
pared the common law to a river which, although it has a source, collects
and intermingles with the waters of numerous tributaries so that “it is
almost an impossible Piece of Chymistry to reduce every Caput Legis to
its true original ... Danish ... Norman ... Saxon or British Law”.51  Then,
importantly, he goes on:
Neither was it, or indeed is it much material, which of
these is their Original; for ’tis very plain, the Strength and
Obligation, and the formal Nature of a Law, is not upon
Account that the Danes, or the Saxons, or the Normans,
brought it with them, but they became Laws, and binding
in this Kingdom, by Virtue only of their being received
and approved here.52
This is a significant shift in emphasis on the basis of legitimacy.
No longer are the crucial criteria the objective ones of longevity or prov-
enance, which the “traditionary common law mind” did not put under
critical scrutiny, but other criteria whose objectivity requires a more self-
conscious effort to be recognized, and, most importantly, a downright
subjective criterion: acceptability. Indeed, the actual “acceptance” referred
to __ these laws were in effect, “they were received here” invokes a more
complex “objective” criterion which is open to critical scrutiny, namely
empirical evidence that the rule actually existed and was treated as bind-
ing. But acceptability __ “they were approved here”, even though does
invoke some standard of what may be law, for example, the “natural law”
standard that no unjust rule can truly be a law is subjective because it
entails that ultimately it was up to an autonomous decision of the English
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and not depending on the nature and content of the laws themselves
whether or not they were treated as binding. So, from having an objective
status as an historical product, common law has become a matter of (pure)
subjectivity. In regard to this, the lesson of Hobbes’ Dialogue to the com-
mon lawyers constitutes a turning point in the history of legal and politi-
cal thought. In sum, because of this, Hobbes __ at least posthumously __
has won his long battle against Coke: even though his political fight, i.e.,
the defence of absolute monarchy, was “lost” by Hume, common law is
not taken as the “objective” embodiment of reason, but as a most valu-
able historical convention which, nevertheless, like all human practices,
can be subject to critical scrutiny.53  In my view, this together with its
arguments in favour of religious toleration is the most enduring legacy of
Hobbes’ Dialogue.
However, this shift towards a kind of consequentialist and infor-
mal utilitarianism in the history of common law must not be seen as lead-
ing to a complete rejection of objectivist and natural law influenced con-
ceptions of common law. Rather it is the emergence of a new discourse
qualifying and complementing the older one. Indeed, the evolution of the
various conceptions of common law was practically mirrored by their
legal and political application in the British and American constitutional
systems (and by the many others which were influenced by them), and
this application always required the blending of different conceptions of
common law and law itself within the evolving constitutional systems:
law itself is not static, but a living, growing institution that reflects society’s
changing conceptions.54
CONCLUSION
This work contends that A Dialogue is responsible for the transi-
tion from the view that common law is an “objective” embodiment of
reason to the historical conventionalist view that it is a generally useful
set of arrangements arrived at through adaptive custom that can be sub-
ject to critical scrutiny, and suggests that this also influences the rise of
important features of Western individualism and liberalism. Even though
it can be argued that the changes that Hale, and later Locke and Hume
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brought to the justification of common law might have happened without
Hobbes, what matters most is the fact that they were reacting to and were
themselves agents in the vast changes in intellectual perspective which
Hobbes and his Dialogue had brought into being.55  In the same vein, it is
true that one may argue that the loss of objectivity of common law and of
the concern to formalise natural right, and eventually also the drift away
from contract, much less a renewable contract, are only loosely connected
and that by no means it is obvious that the outcome of this loss should
lead to a kind of consequentialist and informal utilitarianism because logic
does not preclude other possibilities.56  Nevertheless, this has been the
historically dominant outcome. That is to say, what matters most is that A
Dialogue embodies the rise of important features of liberal individualism
which set in motion the historical process leading to a kind of
consequentialist and informal utilitarianism.
A Dialogue is “liberal” because it recommends toleration. Indeed,
even though toleration has been a policy of absolutist regimes __ in fact
James II had a policy of toleration, it is specifically liberal because it
entails freedom of thought, i.e., the principle from which liberalism stems
from and which some absolutist regimes may have in fact wittingly or
unwittingly encouraged. What is historically and philosophically most sig-
nificant is that A Dialogue’s liberal individualism, conventionalism and
modern subjectivism as well as its plea for religious toleration was re-
called not only few years later by Locke, but also in the following cen-
tury, and even later, by Hume, Burke, Blackstone and Bentham. Hobbes
directly or indirectly provoked these responses by his own use of history
as rhetoric, which undermines traditionary authority based on an “objec-
tive” notion of reason, and required the common lawyers to rethink, deepen
and ultimately reconstruct on more “conventionalist” basis their argu-
ments in favour of the ancient constitution, even though their approach
remains different from Hobbes’.57
As my purpose in writing this paper was philosophical, rather than
historical as such, I conclude by assessing the historical outcome of the
process set in motion by Hobbes within common law and beyond. There
is a potential problem here: once liberalism has surrendered any belief in
objective truths, all personal subjective beliefs become true. The result is
that, on the positive side, the only way you can make a decision is by
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1See, A Dialogue between A Philosopher and A Student of the Common Law
of England, Edited with an Introduction by Joseph Cropsey (Chicago, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1971).
2See, for instance, Andrew Heywood, Political Theory: An Introduction,
Second Edition (London, Mcmillan Press, 1999), p.124.
3In terms of the nomos-physis antithesis, the foundation of political organi-
zation and of the political virtues or aretai in nature (physis) is the obvious alterna-
tive to their foundation in nomos. The appeal to physis often had a normative, rhe-
torical character: that is, physis should be in control; but nomos - conventional mo-
res, customs, human laws - frequently constitute an unwarranted and morally delete-
rious constraint on the operation of nature. We find the appeal to nature conjoined
with a particular notion of an unwritten or ‘common’ (koinos) law. In some cases,
this concept of law is no more than what eventually came to be called the ius gentium
(Latin for law of peoples), those parts of written law or of customary and unwritten
moral principles that held to be shared by all peoples. The ius gentium was construed
by some as the commandments of the god(s) and, as such, would seem to be a matter
of nomos. However, by the fourth century B.C.E. Aristotle identifies common or
universal law, ‘all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowl-
edged everywhere’,’ [Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, 1.10.1368b8-9] as
‘law according to nature’: ‘For there really is, he says, ‘a natural justice and injustice
appeal to your own conscience. But on the negative side, once all things
are equally valid, the only way to attain supremacy is through war and
power. And in regard to this it is relevant to mention that the usurpation
of the great faiths by secular ideology is not usually recognized. But this
process has a historical and a contemporary dimension. For all the major
monotheistic faiths, their primary historical distortion lies with their utili-
zation for the purposes of state formation and nationalism and this pro-
cess has been at work also within common law systems.
Thus liberalism can make out of us all free and responsible citi-
zens, or bigots and religious fundamentalists justifying extreme political
ideologies. When the arrow is primed on the bow sooner or later it must
be unleashed, as the Chinese proverb says. Alas, there is only a fine line
between the two outcomes but only the former holds true to the original
principles of liberalism itself highlighted by Hobbes’ case for religious
toleration and freedom of thought in A Dialogue. The latter outcome
would be tantamount to snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.
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that is common to all, even to those that have no association or covenant with one
another’. [Rhet. 1.1373b6-9] The explicit opposition to nomos (in the form of ‘asso-
ciation or covenant’) is here obvious. But how, more explicitly, are political organi-
zations, law, justice, and the political aretai grounded in physis? At least part of the
answer to this question involves a functionalist conception of aretai, the virtues or
excellences of something. An arete of something X is a quality or capacity that en-
ables X to fulfil well X’s proper ergon, its work, business or function. So if X’s
function is to G, an arete of X, a virtue or excellence of X, makes X a good G-er. The
functionalistic model supplies a framework for grounding the human aretai, includ-
ing the political aretai, in nature (physis) - as opposed to tradition, convention, or
agreement, all gathered together under the concept of nomos. See: Michael J. White,
Political Philosophy: An Historical Introduction, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications,
2003), pp.17-18.
4In the classical tradition of political philosophy represented, for example,
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